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SOVIET STRENGTH AND STRATEGY IN ASIA

By IVAR SPECTOR
Author of
An INTRODUCTION to RUSSIAN HISTORY and CULTURE

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An authentic survey of Soviet thinking, and how it is being directed

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THROWS LIGHT ON ALMOST EVERY ASPECT OF SOVIET POLICY—

AMERICA AN AGGRESSOR?

"It is safe to say that the case against America is already being entered in the 1950 editions of Soviet, Chinese and satellite textbooks."

PEACE?

"The Soviet concept of a peace settlement . . . is basically one by which the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. would divide the world between them. Since Americans are not prepared for such a 'deal', . . . Soviet leaders now intend, if they can, to enforce such a peace upon us."

THE UNITED NATIONS?

"The Soviet press has already implied that the Soviet Union is in a position . . . to set up its own Communist United Nations, which would in numbers be more widely representative than ours of the people of the world."

CHINA?

"As of this date, the main steps taken by Mao Tse-tung (Chinese Communist leader) have almost without exception, and sometimes months in advance, been indicated in the Soviet press."

THREAT TO ALASKA?

"A Slavic population well in excess of the population of Alaska is now located in this strategic region (Tchukotsk Peninsula, across Bering Strait from Alaska) and is available for its defense."



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The only picture of the present Politburo in session, a painting by D. Nalbandyan. The Politburo is studying a diagram of the Stalin plan for "remaking Nature"—the afforestation of the Steppes. Molotov is seated on the left. The others are (left to right): Shvernik, Bulganin, Mikoyan, Krushchev, Stalin, Andreyev, Beria, Kosygin, Voroshilov, Malenkov and Kaganovitch.

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BY THE SAME AUTHOR

COLLEGE RUSSIAN

THE GOLDEN AGE OF RUSSIAN LITERATURE

RUSSIA: A NEW HISTORY

AN INTRODUCTION TO RUSSIAN HISTORY AND CULTURE

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SOVIET STRENGTH AND STRATEGY IN ASIA

IVAR SPECTOR, Ph. D.

Superior PUBLISHING COMPANY, SEATTLE

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FOREWORD

There are few things more important to Americans today than an understanding of the Russian people and the Russian government. With a view to making available to the general public as much material as possible for this purpose, the Far Eastern and Russian Institute of the University of Washington has sponsored and organized the publication of the *Soviet Press Translations* since October 31, 1946. Until very recently, Dr. Ivar Spector served as editor of the *Soviet Press Translations.* He has therefore, in the course of his duties, read with great care the Soviet newspapers and periodicals, and few men are better acquainted with them.

The press, even in the United States, is a treacherous guide to the feelings and views of the American people. As material for interpreting the processes of history, it has to be handled with great care and discretion. In a democratic society the investigator is assisted in his interpretation by having available many other avenues for getting information and analyzing events. But with respect to the Soviet Union, the interpreter of current events has to rely very largely upon the press. There is very little access to the country, and when there is access to the country there are few opportunities to talk with the people. Not many escape from the vast prison camps of the Soviet Union. Even the provincial press of the Soviet Union is difficult to get. Periodicals and books are available but not with the ease, the promptness, and in the quantity to which we are accustomed. The *Soviet Press Translations* is one of the few windows upon the Soviet Union.

One window is rarely sufficient to provide a good view of the whole house, but in this case the window itself is a very peculiar one. The analyst has to keep in mind the specific role of the press in the Soviet Union. It has to be accepted as the organ of a monopoly political party. It may be a good guide to what a dictatorship thinks the people ought to know, but only to the most

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skilled analyst does it reveal the state of the public mind, for this has to be deduced from the way in which the public is handled by the government.

In our *Soviet Press Translations* we have provided the American public with a sample coverage of what the Soviet government has to say about the important issues in the Soviet Union and the world today. Dr. Spector has gone far beyond this material in the articles collected in this book. With his knowledge of the Russian language and character, he has developed a feel for the Russian press which is the basis for his own method of analysis. The reader will find here a great deal of useful information and new interpretation. The responsibility, however, for any statements of facts or opinions rests with Dr. Spector.

GEORGE E. TAYLOR, *Director,*
Far Eastern and Russian Institute,
University of Washington.

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AUTHOR'S FOREWORD

Much of this material is based upon a series of articles originally published in the Seattle *Times* from June 1 to June 11, 1950. An introductory chapter on the Soviet press, the basis for the rest of the material, has been added, and another on Korea brings the collection up to date. Changes and additions have been made in the original articles to bring them into line with the present course of events.

These articles have been revised and published as a book in response to requests from numerous readers that they be made available in permanent form. Since the material is fresh and largely unavailable in the American press, it is hoped that it will provide some of the background indispensable to an understanding of the present world crisis and perhaps afford guidance in the formulation of future policies to deal with it.

From October, 1946, to June, 1950, the writer served as editor of *Soviet Press Translations,* a biweekly publication of the Far Eastern and Russian Institute of the University of Washington.

—I.S.

July 31, 1950,
University of Washington.

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CHAPTER I

THE SOVIET PRESS: A DEFINITION

THE SOVIET PRESS is not a free press. Nor is it a commercial enterprise in our sense of the term. It is wholly controlled by the Soviet government and the Communist Party, as are all periodicals and books published in the USSR. According to an editorial in *Pravda* for May 5, 1949, entitled "The Bolshevik Press —the Keen Weapon of Our Party," there are 7,200 newspapers published in the Soviet Union with a total circulation of 31,000,000 copies. Of these, only a small number of metropolitan papers is available for export, since no foreign subscriptions are accepted for local newspapers or for the organs of the Soviet armed forces and civilian defense. The trend during the past year has been toward the restriction rather than toward the extension of direct access to Soviet papers in foreign countries.

Among the papers which set the tone of the Soviet press throughout the country, and which best reflect Soviet foreign and domestic policies, are *Izvestia,* the official mouthpiece of the government, *Pravda,* the organ of the Communist Party, *Trud,* the labor paper, the weekly *Literary Gazette,* which, as its name implies, is the mouthpiece of the Soviet writers, *Bolshevik* (biweekly), the organ of the Politburo, *Ogonyok,* a popular illustrated weekly which is a kind of combination of *Life* and the *Saturday Evening Post,* and *Crocodile,* the Soviet counterpart of the English humor magazine *Punch.* When conditions are normal, air mail subscriptions to *Pravda* and *Izvestia* reach the University of Washington Library on the fifth day following publication.

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The first thing Americans should know about the Soviet press is that instead of reflecting public opinion, it is primarily intended to mould and shape it. A recent and authentic statement of the purpose of the press, as the mighty Politburo understands it, is to be found in an article entitled "Improve Party Leadership in the Local Press," in *Bolshevik,* No. 6, March, 1950, which states as follows: "The newspaper educates the reader ideologically, and he takes its word as if it were the word of the Party. The newspaper tells the reader how to deport himself and act, how to live and work."

What immediately strikes the average American, accustomed to bulky newspapers, is the size of the Soviet dailies which, except for very special occasions, are restricted to four pages. Nor should he look for the latest and most significant news on the front page —a circumstance which has sometimes misled our correspondents. The average Soviet reader can be counted upon to read his paper from cover to cover.

In spite of the growing industrialization of the Soviet Union, the front page of the Soviet dailies ordinarily reflects the seasons of the year. Instead of the last-minute reports on Acheson's speeches or the alleged failure of the Marshall Plan, usually relegated to the fourth page, one is more likely to learn that around the city of Minsk new crops like kok-sagyz and sugar beets are being introduced this year, or that somewhere in the Ukraine or Siberia a collective farmer has raised bigger and better pigs or horses than last year. High up on the front page of *Pravda* for May 21, 1950, for instance, is a small item about the first agro-city of Uzbekistan, an outgrowth of the "millionaire" Kaganovitch Collective Farm, which is building a Palace of Culture, a stadium, a school, kindergartens, water works and so on.

The Russian reader, either of Soviet or Tsarist times, has had a predilection for editorials and speeches. The Soviet press provides a steady diet of these, with a lengthy editorial usually to be

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found on the front page. When the United Nations is in session, it is the rule rather than the exception to find the better part of one of the inside pages devoted to its activities or to the speeches of Vyshinsky, Manuilsky, or Malik before the Assembly.

The Soviet press, it must be admitted, in spite of the fact that large masses of the population have become literate in this generation, makes no effort to talk down to its readers. Ivan Ivanovitch is conditioned to take scholarly or technical articles in his stride. In a recent six-page issue of *Pravda* (May 16, 1950), the two extra pages were devoted to a lengthy analysis of the principles of the late Soviet scholar, N. Y. Marr, on—of all subjects—Soviet linguistics!

Since the Soviet press is not a commercial enterprise, Americans need not look for advertisements of any kind in the daily papers. The weekly *Ogonyok* has recently gone so far as to advertise caviar, new cereals, and insurance, but even here advertisement is the exception rather than the rule. The daily papers contain listings of radio programs and theatre attractions, with an occasional announcement of a series of public lectures.

Soviet readers of the American press are apt to be astounded when they first encounter the reports on accidents, crimes, divorces, weddings and other society news, and the sports sections that make up such a large part of our daily news. Such matters are ignored by the Soviet press, except for brief references to such sports as chess contests or football matches. To get her name in a Soviet paper, the Russian woman has to achieve some startling record in farm or factory production, or in some scholarly pursuit.

Since the Soviet press is controlled by the government and the Communist Party, and there is no private press, it stands to reason that one will not find there any criticism of the government or its policies—foreign or domestic. The government and the Party as such are regarded as infallible. It is possible to criticize officials in the government who have abused their au-

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thority, but if they are top officials the cue must come from Party leaders. In other words, Soviet Foreign Minister Vyshinsky, at least as long as he remains in office, will never be criticized as Secretary of State Acheson has been in the United States.

While the Soviet press is not free, there is a safety-valve known as "criticism and self-criticism," the value of which is constantly emphasized by the Party. It affords an opportunity for some disgruntled Soviet citizens to blow off their steam, to point out shortcomings in the conduct of factory or field work, and deviations from the orthodox Party line. It affords others an opportunity to confess their errors in the hope that they may be given a second chance.

Since self-criticism has become an established feature of the Soviet press today, one is likely to find there specific complaints about the collective farms of a particular district which are behind in planting or harvesting their crops, about factory managers that permit wasteful practices in their enterprises, about teachers who have not paid sufficient homage to Marxist-Leninist ideology in their classes or in their texts, and about lumber trusts and other enterprises that have not fulfilled their quotas for the postwar Stalin Five-Year Plan. Indeed, last January the daily newspaper *Socialist Agriculture* took to listing the collective farms that were leading and those that were lagging in various regions in the repair of agricultural machinery.

That there are limits to such criticism is occasionally apparent. The well known Soviet writer, Konstantin Simonov, one of whose works was not long ago criticized, in a lengthy article in *Bolshevik,* No. 3, 1950, distinguished between constructive and destructive criticism, and demanded that critics tell what was good as well as what was bad about Soviet books, and how their authors could redeem them.

The magazine *Crocodile* (November 30, 1949) took occasion to poke fun at the numerous confessions elicited by the avalanche

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of self-criticism. It told how, in response to an inquiry as to why a certain Semyon Semyonovitch was fired, since he had admitted his mistakes, the management had finally admitted its mistake, which was that it had always forgiven his mistakes. Incidentally, a very large proportion of the cartoons in *Crocodile* today are aimed at the United States, especially at the Marshall Plan, Wall Street, the Atlantic Bloc, and what is labeled American imperialism. It is quite safe to direct criticism at the United States and the other Western democracies. In fact, it is highly unsafe to abstain from such tactics.

The personality of Stalin occupies an altogether unique place in the Soviet press. If his picture is not there on the front page of newspapers or magazines, one can be certain that there will be numerous references to his "concern" for the welfare of the people, to his initiation of major achievements in science, strategy, or technology, and that there will be quotations from his speeches and writings. Indeed, within the past two years, even in scholarly works published by the USSR Academy of Sciences, no matter what the field, we are sure to find some tribute to Stalin's contribution and quotations from his works to substantiate the author's thesis. On the occasion of Stalin's 70th anniversary, December 21, 1949, this adulation, amounting almost to deification, reached a new peak throughout the Soviet press, both in poetry and in prose.

Since *Izvestia* is the government organ, everything published therein may be regarded as official. However, *Pravda,* the semi-official Party mouthpiece, is in reality the power behind the throne. It sets the tone in ideological matters and its journalists are probably the best in the Soviet Union. To put it in commonplace English, whereas *Izvestia* represents the State, *Pravda* represents the Communist "Church."

In this connection, it should also be noted that the tone set by *Pravda* and *Izvestia* on any subject will serve as a pattern for all

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newspapers and periodicals in the USSR. For instance, once Mitchurin's and Lysenko's teachings on biology became official, every paper carried articles on Mitchurin and Lysenko. When two pages were devoted to the 150th anniversary of the death of General Suvorov (*Pravda,* May 18, 1950) who once fought the French armies in Italy and Switzerland, every paper, in accordance with its own approach and interest, included news about Suvorov. Today one can be sure that all Soviet papers will denounce "cosmopolitanism" as a Western "bourgeois" outlook, will attack the Marshall Plan and the Atlantic Bloc, will decry American "aggression" in Korea, Formosa, etc., and will carry articles or reports on the "Partisans of Peace."

On major changes in the Party line one can never be long in doubt. He will find the new trend indicated in every organ of the Soviet press. It is therefore highly indicative that in recent months both scholarly and popular organs of the Soviet press have carried an increasing number of articles, editorials, and news items on the Far East, in an obvious effort to make the Soviet people Asia conscious.

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CHAPTER II

THE SLAVIC BELT

ALTHOUGH THE Soviet Union made unprecedented efforts in the years prior to the Nazi invasion to win over Soviet minorities and make of them "an asset rather than a liability," as they were under the Tsarist regime, World War II proved that they were not entirely successful. During the early stages of the war there were mass desertions of both troops and civilians to the Germans. Not only did some of the non-Slavic peoples along the Baltic and in the Caucasus prove untrustworthy, but even many of the Ukrainians. According to the Soviet press, which has emphasized the point on numerous occasions in recent years, it was the Great Russians who bore the main brunt of the war and brought about the defeat of the German invaders.

During World War II it became apparent that where settlements of Great Russians predominated, the Germans met with fierce and implacable resistance. But in the Baltic area, the Ukraine and the Caucasus, the Germans advanced with comparatively little difficulty. While the Soviet government never attacked the minorities as such, it did, without warning, as the Germans advanced toward Stalingrad in 1942, take the precaution of transplanting to Siberia the population of the flourishing German autonomous republic on the Volga and resettled the area with Great Russians.

Since the war this process has been continued, but on a much larger scale. As the cold war developed, a virtual Slavic belt of Great Russians was fastened around the Soviet minorities of the Russian borderlands, especially in Asiatic Russia.

Soviet attention was directed, first, to the Central Asiatic Republics, the soft under-belly of the USSR, which is exposed to invasion from the Middle East and which leads directly to the vital Soviet oil resources and to the indispensable industrial area of the Urals. In some of these republics, judging by the Soviet press, the Slavic population already outnumbers the natives.

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Large numbers of Russians have been brought in, ostensibly to assist in the development of new industries, irrigation projects and mining enterprises.

Next in importance to the Central Asiatic border were the strategically exposed Baltic area in Europe and the Mongolian frontier in Asia. When, for a time following World War II, it seemed likely that the China of Chiang Kai-shek might replace Japan as a none-too-friendly neighbor of the Soviet Union, the Soviet government turned its attention to the autonomous republic of Buryat Mongolia and the nominally "independent" state of Outer Mongolia. The same influx of Russians occurred, until, according to the Soviet press in 1949, Ulan-Bator resembled a Russian city. Mongol education and development proceeded along clearly Soviet lines. In 1949 the Mongols even adopted the Russian alphabet. Meanwhile, on various pretexts and as a result of lucrative offers, many Mongols inside the Soviet borders and from Outer Mongolia were prevailed upon to "go West" to the Baltic, to replace so-called "unreliable" elements which the Soviets had deliberately moved away from the periphery. Mongol troops, incidentally, had done yoeman service in 1941 in the defense of Moscow.

What must have caused a shiver to run through all the Soviet minorities, however, was Soviet action immediately following the war in removing the entire Tartar population of the Crimea, which had collaborated with the Germans, to Siberia. The area was promptly settled by Russians, and it is now claimed that the Crimea is as Russian as the cities of Orel or Kursk. This drastic Soviet action must have been tatamount to genocide, owing to the extreme change in climate from the subtropics of the Crimea to the severe Siberian winter.

Since 1947 the Soviet government has paid increasing attention to the population and development of the Tchukotsk Peninsula directly across the Bering Strait from Alaska. The first

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real indication of the scope of this activity came when the Soviet labor newspaper *Trud* on February 6, 1947, took the almost unprecedented step of advertising for engineers of all categories, technicians, doctors, teachers, storekeepers, miners, etc., for work in Tchukotka and Kolyma and specified recruiting offices in various parts of the Soviet Union (*Soviet Press Translations,* Volume II, No. 8, April 30, 1947). Significantly enough, the advertisement did not appear in *Pravda* or *Izvestia,* which are widely read by foreign journalists, but in the less well-known, but nevertheless highly important paper, *Trud.*

Irrespective of whether the Soviet government was motivated in part by a desire to develop the untapped mineral resources of this remote area or by other reasons, the fact is that a Slavic population well in excess of the population of Alaska is now located in this strategic region and is available for its defense.

The Slavic element of the Kamtchatka peninsula has likewise increased, as has that of the Kurile Islands. Also, recent colonies of Slavs have been settled along the Amur River. Special attention has been devoted of late to Southern Sakhalin, recovered from the Japanese, where the influx of Russians and even Ukrainians, encouraged by privileges unavailable in Russia proper, including ten years exemption from taxation, has been the subject of a number of articles in the Soviet press and of more than one novel. One such novel, *Here It Is Already Morning* by Alexander Tchakovsky, which ran as a serial in the literary magazine *Znamya* (Nos. 9, 10, 11, 1949), had as its theme the struggle of two worlds—the one symbolized by the red flag, the other by the stars and stripes over Alaska. Perhaps mention should be made of the fact that while Ukrainians might not be trusted to fight the Germans in Europe, in Sakhalin they could be expected to fight against the Japanese.

It should be noted that the Slavic Belt is not confined to the Soviet Union, but that the Slavic satellite states in Eastern Eu-

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rope and the Balkans lie along its outermost rim in the West. These Slavic elements might be expected to support the Soviet Union in the event of a recurrence of German aggression. Meanwhile, the presence of large Soviet garrisons and Soviet military "advisers" in their midst is intended as a guarantee that they will not follow the Tito pattern. Moreover, it can be assumed that, barring a general conflagration, any uprising along the fringe of this belt, instigated by local or foreign efforts, is certain to be ruthlessly suppressed by the Soviet government and may even lead to a further exchange of populations on a wholesale scale. Americans, encouraged by exiles and D.P.'s from the Soviet satellites who confidently hope and work for the defection of these countries from the Soviet orbit in line with Tito's example, should be prepared for drastic Soviet action which may well leave these unhappy peoples in a far worse plight than before.

It is now apparent that the Great Russian element of the USSR, amounting in all to more than 100,000,000 people, has taken a firm grip on the country as a whole, and that it has formed an iron belt around the extended frontiers of the Soviet Union as a barrier against external threat or internal dissension. Needless to say, these deliberate and large-scale population shifts are something with which our military strategists must reckon.

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CHAPTER III

THE DE-EUROPEANIZATION OF RUSSIA

A CAREFUL STUDY of the Soviet press makes it apparent that what is taking place today is the gradual de-Europeanization of Russia. Whether this process is a result of the East-West cold war or of the new Soviet orientation toward China, or perhaps a combination of both, is immaterial. Irrespective of the motives underlying it, the de-Europeanization of Russia is manifest in almost every phase of Russian life.

Under the Tsarist regime and even in the early stages of the Bolshevik Revolution, Europeanization denoted progress and civilization to the Russian educated class, with the exception of some of the more extreme Slavophiles. Today, anything that savors of Western civilization or culture is taboo.

Since Russian scholarship has been bound by close ties to the West, it goes without saying that scholars, irrespective of their field, are among the chief victims of this reaction against all things European. Those who write books must even abandon, as far as possible, the use of words of foreign (Western) origin, if they are to avoid adverse criticism in the press.

A striking example of this is to be found in two texts on Russian literature, one by Zertchaninov and Porfiridov, the other by Kolokoltsev and Litvinov, which had been used successfully for some years in Soviet pedagogical schools, but which are now, in the second edition, being censured severely because their authors quoted extensively from Western sources and erred by using Western terminology.

By the same token another writer, B. A. Rybakov, who in 1948 published a weighty tome (792 pages, 144 illustrations) on *Arts and Crafts in Ancient Russia* is now held up as a model to Soviet writers because he literally coined Russian words where none be-

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fore existed and his book is not "marred" by any resort to European terminology. It is safe to say, however, that this Russian scholar in all probability spent as much time on the selection and coining of terms as on writing the book.

Incidentally, the host of foreign terms introduced into the Russian language during the first Five-Year Plan as a result of intensified industrialization is now rapidly being Russianized, although the door is left open to the incorporation of words of Asiatic origin, especially Central Asiatic.

To what lengths this de-Europeanization has gone is likewise evinced by a recent critic, Professor E. Agayan, who in calling for the ideological purity of Soviet linguistics in the *Literary Gazette,* questions the Indo-European origin of the languages of the Soviet Union. It has taken Russian and Western scholars many years to establish that Russian is an Indo-European language, which is now emphatically rejected by Soviet ideologists as a bourgeois fallacy. On the other hand, Soviet linguists have of late pointed out that the Russian language is basically an "autochthon," and, if anything, has more in common with Asiastic languages than with European.

On June 20, 1950, almost on the eve of the invasion of Southern Korea, Stalin published an article in *Pravda* "Concerning Marxism in Linguistics," which at one fell stroke removed from his pedestal the late N. Y. Marr, heretofore acknowledged to be the foremost Soviet philologist. In commonplace English, the slogan coined in the 1930's by Stalin that the entire educational program in the USSR should be "national in form, socialist in content" is now applied to linguistics. Upon closer examination, it has been found that Marr's thesis is cosmopolitan and socialist in form, but national in content, and is therefore in error. The pronouncement by Stalin marks one more step in the break with Western scholarship. In the summer of 1950, incidentally, even Soviet tourists were upbraided for applying such terms as the

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"Russian Riviera" and the "Russian Switzerland" to popular resorts in the USSR (*Literary Gazette,* July 22, 1950). The paper complained that "no one has yet extolled the beauty of the shores of Lake Baikal and the banks of the Lena and Yenisei Rivers, before which all the beauty of Europe pales into insignificance."

Today, the Soviet press is making the Russian people China-conscious, to an extent which it is difficult for the average American to grasp. A virtual avalanche of books, articles, and pamphlets on Asia, particularly on China, has been pouring from the Soviet press, from daily and weekly newspapers, from magazines, and even from the more academic quarterlies.

One of the most significant of these publications, which may well serve as a landmark in the de-Europeanization of Russia, and especially as to how it is being accomplished on a higher level, is a book which appeared several months ago (1949) by S. V. Kiselev on *The Ancient History of Southern Siberia.* Ostensibly this history, as the title implies, deals with southern Siberia in ancient times. But actually it goes much farther. It attempts to establish similarities between the history and development of early societies in Russia and in Asia. This text is being used now in all colleges and universities throughout the Soviet Union. Moreover, a Chinese version is in preparation, which will soon be moulding the thinking of Chinese students.

Whether or not the USSR is going to invade Western Europe physically, time alone can tell. But one thing is clear, judging by the Soviet press. Russia is withdrawing spiritually from Europe and all that Western European civilization connotes. She is at present casting her lot with Asia, and especially with the China of Mao Tse-tung.

It is still difficult to tell what the ultimate effects of the new orientation toward China will be. Historically speaking, however, whenever Russia has pursued an isolationist policy *vis à vis* Western Europe, reaction and totalitarianism have triumphed within the country—a situation which is only too apparent today.

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In recent years, Russian historians and novelists have vied with one another to compare Stalin with Peter the Great. One of the best examples known to Americans is the Sergei Eisenstein film *Peter I,* based on the historical novel by that name by the late Alexei Tolstoy. However, a careful study of the Soviet press since World War II suggests that while Peter the Great made every attempt to Europeanize Russia, Stalin definitely has embarked upon the de-Europeanization of the Soviet Union.

CHAPTER IV

THE INDUSTRIALIZATION OF THE URALS AND CENTRAL ASIA

JOSEPH STALIN, in June, 1930, speaking at the XVIth Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik), made what must now be regarded as a historic report. It was then that he first recommended the establishment of a new coal-metallurgical base in Siberia to equal or surpass that of the Donbass in the Ukraine. Stalin advanced two reasons for such a program: one, that the production of the Donbass was no longer adequate to meet the needs of the Five-Year Plan; and the other, that in the event of war the Soviet Union needed an industrial base beyond the reach of enemy attack.

Within the next few years the new coal-metallurgical base, with its main centers at Kuznetsk and Magnitogorsk, took shape and soon proved its worth in World War II. According to V. Mikhailov in *Pravda* for May 15, 1950, in an article entitled "A Mighty Industrial Base in the East," the "Magnitogorsk and Kuznetsk metallurgical combines, provided with the most up-to-date technical equipment, have been transformed into bases for the

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technological reconstruction of the economic areas of the East, and of the entire national economy of the USSR." It is safe to say that the Ural area has become the industrial spinal cord of the Soviet Union.

Today a third great coal base is being developed in the Karaganda Basin of the Central Asiatic Republic of Kazakhstan. The search for new coal deposits continues without respite, with the recent development of Arctic resources along the Petchora River east of Archangel, where the reserves are estimated to be as high as 500,000,000,000 tons.

It is true that, when the Russians think of Soviet industrial development, they think first of the Urals. Nevertheless, during the war and the postwar years some very striking progress has been reported in the hitherto undeveloped areas of the five Central Asiatic Republics of Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Tadjikistan, Kirghizia, and Uzbekistan, the last being known as "the Socialist beacon in the East."

As early as March, 1919, Stalin, himself, provided the key to Bolshevik objectives in Soviet Central Asia: "To build a citadel of Soviet power in the East, to erect a Socialist beacon in Kazan and Ufa, in Samarkand and Tashkent, which will light the path of deliverance for the weary peoples of the East—such is our task."

Uzbekistan, according to A. Niyazov, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Uzbek SSR, writing in *Izvestia,* October 21, 1947, has within the span of one generation become just such a beacon. Whereas in Tsarist times there was not one textile factory in this land of cotton and silk, he lists many new industrial centers in the republic today, including Tchirtchik, known for its chemical, power, and machine-building industries; Yangi-Yul, a center of food production and light industry; Angren, the Uzbek coal pit; and Kuvasai, a base for the construction materials industry. The ancient cities of Samarkand

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and Kokand, he claims, have been transformed beyond recognition. Tashkent has become the center of the Central Asiatic textile industry.

More recently, a *Pravda* editorial for January 17, 1950, reports that the city of Begovat, where the Hungry Steppe and the sands of Dalverzin meet, has become a metallurgical center, where the natives are being trained in the art of steel smelting by experts from the Urals and the Donbass. *Pravda* indicates that the new city of Leninsk is the center of the republic's oil production. Needless to say, some of the new industrial centers of Central Asia are not yet to be found on our maps. The vast irrigation projects, like the Stalin Great Ferghana Canal and the Farkhad hydro-electric plant, have helped to make possible a considerable expansion of agriculture and industry.

During the Stalin Five-Year Plans, according to S. H. Batyrov, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Turkmenistan, the Soviet government has invested over 2,500,000,000 rubles in Turkmenia, formerly the most backward area of Tsarist Russia's colonial borderland. The largest oil fields of Central Asia, he reports in *Pravda* for January 29, 1950, have now been developed in Turkmenistan. Batyrov claims that 42 percent of the enterprises of the republic are major enterprises of heavy industry, located in places like Ashkhabad, Krasnovodsk, and Tchardzhou, and that industry has already surpassed agriculture in production. Turkmenia, where these developments are taking place, borders on Iran.

Writing in *Pravda* on November 2, 1947, S. Shayakhmetov, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, depicted the former nomadic outpost of Old Russia as a flourishing industrial and agrarian republic with more than 6,700 *kolkhozi,* 254 *sovkhozi,* and 363 Machine and Tractor Stations. Industrial centers have sprung up at Karaganda, Balkhash, Temir-Tau, Ust-Kamenogorsk, etc. Where camel caravans once

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passed, the Party Secretary reports that railroads, highways, telegraph lines and air routes provide links with the other republics of the Soviet Union.

In Tadjikistan, which did not exist as a political unit on pre-Revolutionary maps, D. Rasulov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Tadjik SSR, reports in *Izvestia,* October 18, 1947, that 154 new enterprises have been established during the Five-Year Plans and that 270 deposits of rare and nonferrous metals and minerals have been discovered, 70 of which were already being exploited. The city of Stalinabad, once a little-known *kishlak,* is described as a modern industrial capital with dozens of mills and factories. The irrigation of the Vakhsh Valley has enabled tens of thousands of migrants from the mountains near the borders of Afghanistan and Western China to turn to the cultivation of cotton, grapes and fruit. Similar developments have taken place in the Soviet Republic of Kirghizia.

In addition to the vast sums already expended by the Soviet government in the development of Central Asia, it is clear from the Soviet press that even greater plans are envisaged in the immediate future for this highly strategic area. A little-known engineer, M. Davydov, recently revealed a blueprint whereby in the near future "it would be possible to irrigate more than 30,000,000 hectares of land in Central Asia and Kazakhstan with the waters of the Ob and the Yenisei—an area seven times larger than the land under irrigation at present." This project was revealed, not in *Pravda* or *Izvestia,* nor even in the labor paper *Trud,* but in *Literaturnaya Gazeta* for January 1, 1949, under the title "Orchards to Bloom in the Desert."

In connection with the mushrooming of industrial growth in Soviet Central Asia, it should be noted that in addition to the Slavic Belt referred to in a previous chapter, small industrial centers have been established close to the periphery. This strategy serves a twofold purpose. It serves to impress visitors from neigh-

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boring Asiatic lands with some idea of the industrial progress of the Soviet republics, as compared with their own industrially backward countries. And since World War II demonstrated that industrial centers provided better bases of resistance to enemy invasion than the broad expanses of rural areas, the construction of such centers along the Asiatic periphery is an integral part of the Soviet defense program. These cities likewise provide facilities for the repair of modern mechanized implements of war, including tanks and all kinds of motorized vehicles.

Although industrialization is proceeding apace throughout the Soviet Union, it seems clear that tremendous stress is being laid upon the utmost development of the Urals and Central Asia. Whereas this industrial growth, especially that of the Urals, is designed mainly to boost production for the domestic market, there has been more than one hint in the Soviet press that the new plants in Central Asia will be used in the future to provide exports, first of all for China, and then for the Middle, and even the Near East.

It is likewise clear that to promote this industrial development at top speed, when machines are lacking, the Soviet government resorts to the use of manpower. It is in the Urals and Central Asia, therefore, that unknown numbers of slave laborers and prisoners of war are used to pave the way to the new era. From these areas Western travellers are almost without exception being excluded. In Central Asia, for the most part, only an occasional Moslem leader is permitted to view the transformation and carry back the news to his homeland.

Once the strategic importance of the Urals and Central Asia is grasped, Americans will understand why the Soviet government is so sensitive about developments in neighboring Iran, and to a lesser extent, Afghanistan. The USSR undoubtedly intends to take every precaution to defend this area from invasion by air or by land, for the destruction of the industrial spinal cord, if

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it did not spell doom, might at least paralyze the military potential of the Soviet Union in time of war. In time of peace, it can serve as a most effective propaganda beacon throughout Asia. We can no longer afford to ignore it.

CHAPTER V

THE PLIGHT OF SOVIET LABOR SINCE THE WAR

In spite of the fact that the Soviet government and the Communist Party have worked for a generation to put an end to private initiative and to move in the direction, first of socialism and ultimately of communism, it is clear from the Soviet press that they have not yet succeeded in reaching their goal.

In time of emergency, as in the reconstruction periods following World Wars I and II, Soviet authorities tolerated a temporary "retreat" from socialization and made many concessions to private initiative in business and agriculture. In each case, as the economic situation improved, restrictions were re-imposed on the individual and the all-out campaign for socialization was resumed.

In 1945, for instance, the Soviet government went so far as to loan money to private individuals in the Ukraine and other devastated areas in European Russia to enable them to build houses or set themselves up in small businesses.

The best barometer of Soviet "recovery" in 1950 is the campaign now under way for increased socialization. Just as the kulaks, or so-called rich peasants were forced by the Five-Year Plan to disgorge what they had accumulated under the New Economic Policy (1921-28), today the Soviet worker and especially the *kolkhoznik* (collective farmer) by the revaluation of the ruble, contributions to state reconstruction loans and stepped-up

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measures for socialization, is losing much of what he was permitted to accumulate during the war and postwar years.

In addition to resorting to private initiative for the more rapid reconstruction of devastated areas in European Russia, Soviet leaders have likewise made effective use of it in the opening up and settlement of new areas in Siberia and the Far North. By such inducements as better wages, better housing, more livestock, exemption from taxes for ten years, etc., many settlers have been persuaded to trek beyond the Urals and even to the Arctic. In other words, the Soviet regime has consistently resorted to the use of the carrot as well as the club. When persuasion has failed to meet the needs of the program, the government has without compunction made use of coercion.

Most Americans have had their attention called rather dramatically to the existence of "slave labor" in the Soviet Union. Former inmates of slave-labor camps, who escaped during or since the war, and prisoners of war who have returned to their homeland, have provided graphic tales of their individual experiences. Estimates as to the number of persons so confined have ranged anywhere from 2,000,000 to 15,000,000 persons, out of a population of some 211,000,000. It stands to reason that only the Soviet government could disclose the exact figure and it won't tell. The Soviet press makes no reference to this labor as "slave labor," although it undoubtedly exists, except to deny the allegations of the Western powers or the UNO.

While this so-called slave or prison labor is an old, old story in Russia, and indeed in many parts of the world outside the Western democracies, there are other types of forced labor that are far more prevalent and which have affected not just a fraction but the bulk of the Soviet workers.

As far as common or unskilled laborers in the USSR are concerned, they are frequently moved in droves from one area to another with no opportunity to refuse. At the end of the war,

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demobilized soldiers were often sent where the government wished them to go—even to far-off Sakhalin.

With skilled or white-collar labor, the Soviet regime has often resorted to different tactics. In 1948, for example, when a survey of government offices and trusts disclosed a "surplus" of white-collar personnel, in the interests of "efficiency" large numbers were arbitrarily removed and sent forthwith to jobs in other parts of the Soviet Union.

Not only has the Soviet government weeded out its bureaucracy in this fashion; but mediocre professional people and the "average" student are likely to meet the same fate. The humorous magazine *Krokodil* (Crocodile) has frequently registered what happens to the surplus bureaucrat or student. Among other instances, we find one in *Krokodil* for December 10, 1948, about a Soviet coed whose professor had assured her that with her limited knowledge she would never "get very far," and who was astounded to find that she was being sent to a remote destination "on the periphery."

It should be stated here that the best brains in the Soviet professions, industry and agriculture, so long as they do not obstruct the government program, are likely to be accorded every facility and numerous privileges, including the best wages, housing, domestic service, and library and technical equipment in the country. These amenities are available to but a small fraction of the population.

In addition to the compulsory assignment of labor, there is another type which we in America would be more likely to term "sweatshop" labor that should be mentioned. In order to reach and surpass the prewar 1940 level in industry and agriculture as rapidly as possible, Soviet workers have been subjected to tremendous pressure in the postwar years. This is in marked contrast to the United States where government wartime pressures for production were relaxed immediately the war came to an end.

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The Soviet press has been literally filled with articles urging the increase of labor quotas, the introduction of labor competitions between factories and collective farms, etc. The following headlines are typical of the postwar years: "Steadily Increase the Capacity of Every Enterprise" (*Pravda,* September 29, 1948); "Speedily Improve the Quality of Our Products!" (*Pravda,* October 20, 1948); "Steadily Increase the Tempo of Production" (*Izvestia,* November 20, 1948); "Ural Miners Will Increase the Output of Coal" (*Pravda,* January 6, 1949); "Some Questions on Raising the Labor Productivity of Women Workers" (*Pravda,* January 24, 1949); and so on, *ad infinitum.*

In 1948 the Soviet government introduced a high-pressure campaign for profits which was as significant as the earlier introduction of piece-work in 1931 in spurring production. The American press has taken too little cognizance of the fact that, just one hundred years after the publication of Karl Marx's *Communist Manifesto,* the Soviet regime has required every Soviet enterprise to show a profit, the bigger the better.

Faced with disgrace and removal if they failed to show a substantial profit, and well rewarded if they did, many Soviet managers resorted, either with the government's consent or on their own initiative, to gross infractions of the labor laws in order to increase production and cut down waste. By the fall of 1949 the situation had apparently gone too far and the government was forced to step in, ostensibly as the champion of the workers who had been so severely exploited in the carrying out of the government program.

An editorial in the Soviet labor paper *Trud* for September 30, 1949, entitled "Strictly Observe the Laws on Working Time," told the story only too clearly. The Soviet trade unions were warned, among other things, to enforce the labor laws, that it was "high time to put an end to the illegal use of overtime hours, to the postponement and cancellation of off-days, as well as to

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the shortening of the dinner hour." In spite of this warning, however, the high-pressure campaign for greater production and better quality continued throughout the summer of 1950, as indicated by an editorial in *Trud,* July 22, 1950, under the headline "Persistently Fight for an Increase in the Productivity of Labor," and another in the same paper for August 2, 1950, entitled "Step Up the Campaign for Quality Production." To the question as to whether there is any limit to such demands on the strength and will power of the Soviet people in the battle for production, the Soviet novelist A. Voloshin, in the 1950 Stalin Prize novel *Kuznetsk Land,* has given the decisive answer: "No, there are no such limits!"

It must be acknowledged that the Soviet Union has made rapid strides toward recovery since 1945. Just to cite one example, it is reported in *Pravda,* May 24, 1950, that enterprising workers in the city of Stalino in the heart of the reconstructed Donbass, including miners, metallurgists, machinebuilders, collective farmers, and members of the intelligentsia, have recently bought Pobeda and Moskvitch automobiles. That workers who can buy cars, bicycles, radios, and other facilities are still the exception rather than the rule is indicated by the fact that their names are frequently listed in the Soviet press.

Soviet postwar recovery has not been accomplished, however, by voluntary labor, as in America, or by a remarkable degree of self-discipline and self-denial, as in England, but by means of a terrific pressure campaign on the part of the Soviet government and the Communist Party which led to sweatshop labor conditions, by the arbitrary transfer of "surplus" labor from one part of the country to another in the overall interests of the State, and in part by the use of "slave labor" and prisoners of war.

It is equally clear that the stepped-up campaign for increased socialization in 1950, as against earlier concessions to private initiative, indicates that in the eyes of Soviet leaders the immediate crisis of the postwar years has been surmounted, even

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without American aid. Those Americans who expect the Soviet regime to collapse from within would do well to realize that the leaders of that regime are now obviously confident that, for the time being, they are well able to cope with any internal discontent incident to the curbing of private initiative and its further subordination to the interests of the State.

CHAPTER VI

RUSSIA AND CHINA: SOME STRIKING PARALLELS

ANY AMERICAN who has followed attentively the course of the Russian Revolution and likewise the recent upheaval in China can not fail to observe certain striking parallels between the two.

The Russian Revolution emerged from the holocaust of World War I, the victory of Communism in China from World War II. In the two basically agricultural countries, land hunger and widespread agrarian discontent ostensibly made a vital contribution to the seizure of power by the extreme revolutionaries. The most striking parallel, however, is to be found in the course and outcome of the Chinese and Russian Civil Wars which in each case accompanied the Revolution.

The military strategy of the Chinese Civil War bears such a striking resemblance to its Russian counterpart that one can only conclude that either the Chinese generals themselves had made an intensive study of the Russian struggle and profited thereby, or they were advised by Russian military strategists who helped them to apply the lessons of the Russian civil conflict. What is surprising is that the Kuomintang and its foreign advisers apparently failed to detect this strategy, and, on the basis of detection, to outmaneuver the Communist armies.

Even the outcome of the Civil War in China, as we view it

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today, with the Kuomintang driven from the Chinese mainland to its headquarters on the island of Formosa, cannot but recall Baron Peter Wrangel's retreat to the Crimea and the ultimate evacuation of the White Russian forces. In both Russia and China the foreign intervention, designed primarily to stem the tide of revolution, actually served to put the revolutionaries in the saddle.

For the immediate background of the present situation in China and for some perspective on the future role of the Chinese People's Republic in the Orient, every American should read and study a speech and an article by the Chinese Communist leader, Mao Tse-tung, both of which reached the Western world, significantly enough, via the Russian Communist newspaper *Pravda.*

The speech, entitled "The Current Situation and Our Problems," delivered by Mao Tse-tung on December 25, 1947, before a meeting of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, was published approximately two weeks later on January 6, 1948, in *Pravda,* under the title "Speech by Mao Tse-tung." The article, under the title "The Dictatorship of the People's Democracy," was written to commemorate the twenty-eighth anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party on July 1, 1949, and was published in *Pravda* on July 6, 1949.

It was in the speech that Mao Tse-tung, for the first time in the Chinese Civil War, ventured to make a bid for the control of all China. Under the conditions prevailing at that time, with Chiang Kai-shek still in control of vastly superior forces and equipment, Mao Tse-tung's speech was unfortunately laughed off or ignored. The fact that it was published in full in *Pravda* indicated a confidence in, if not a commitment to an ultimate Communist victory in China, which the Western supporters of the Kuomintang might well have taken more seriously.

Of even greater significance for the Western democracies was Mao Tse-tung's article on "The Dictatorship of the People's Democracy." Whereas in the speech referred to above Mao made a bid for all China, in this article he practically makes a bid for

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the Orient. Once China was in Communist hands, he pointed out, the Chinese were in duty bound to render assistance to those nations on their borders and beyond that are in revolt against colonial domination.

In brief, although Mao Tse-tung's domestic program, as revealed in this article, recalls the limited agrarian reforms advocated by the Social Revolutionaries in Russia in the Revolution of 1905, in foreign policy he stands today, like Trotsky before him, for permanent world revolution, or at least for revolution in Asia. In fact, he has practically committed himself to play the same role in Asia that Russia is now playing in Europe. In other words, judging by the Soviet press, with the fall of China, the revolution in Asia has just begun.

As of to date the main steps taken by Mao Tse-tung, almost without exception and sometimes months in advance, have been indicated in the Soviet press. It is likewise clear in that press today that if Mao Tse-tung succeeds in his bid for the control of the Far East, the Russians expect perhaps without firing a shot in the direction of the Dardanelles or Iran, to outflank the Middle and Near East as well as Europe. In other words, the Sino-Soviet Axis constitutes a gigantic pincer movement of unprecedented proportions. Americans have only to consult their maps to understand its implications.

The United States government, having heretofore subordinated Asia to Europe, has now appropriated a few million dollars to stem the tide of Communism in Southeast Asia. The scope of the effort so far envisaged not only appears to informed Americans to be pitifully inadequate to meet the needs of the emergency, but, in response to Secretary Acheson's California speech of March 5, the Chinese press, as reported in a *Pravda* article on March 21, 1950, entitled "The Truth About Asia and the American Lie," has already discounted our chances of success. If our "extensive aid" to the tune of $6,000,000,000 to Kuomintang China resulted in a fiasco, it is hardly to be expected, they claim,

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that "aid on a much smaller scale" to Southeast Asia will prove any more effective.

The situation calls to mind the story of the Russian peasant whose persistent efforts to rid his hut of bugs were of no avail. When one day his house caught fire, and surrounded by his weeping family and neighbors he watched his worldly possessions go up in smoke, he burst out laughing and cried out in glee: "At last I have had my revenge on those troublesome bugs!" Let us hope that we in America will not so concentrate on the search for obnoxious "bugs" in our homeland that we will wake up to find our world in flames.

CHAPTER VII

TITOISM AND CHINA

TITO'S REVOLT against the Cominform in 1948 was a rude jolt to the Soviet Union. Judging by the Soviet press, the Politburo was originally divided over the issue. One group headed by Andrei Zhdanov was for action, even military action, against Yugoslavia. However, the majority, led by Stalin, preferred a more cautious course, short of war. When it became apparent that Zhdanov's policy might provoke an incident and decide the issue, he suddenly took ill and died.

The monthly magazine *Slavyanye* (The Slavs), the official mouthpiece of the Cominform, was ostensibly designed to consolidate the Slavic world. In reality, it now serves as a platform for the defeat of Titoism in Europe and the Balkans. Strangely enough, Tito was ostracized for attempting to do in Yugoslavia approximately what the Soviet government has been doing in the USSR. At home, the Soviet regime is implanting ultra-nationalism under socialistic nomenclatures in every branch of human endeavor. However, what the Russians propagate at home, they

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deny to the satellites. The reason is obvious. Satellite nationalism and Soviet leadership are irreconcilable. It is therefore interesting to note that the Russian nationalism, which is reflected daily in *Pravda* and *Izvestia,* is absent or very much toned down in *Slavyanye.*

The extent to which Titoism has frightened the Soviet Union is evident from the fact that in his speeches Mao Tse-tung has over and over again assured the Kremlin that there will be no Titoism in China. The question arises, therefore, as to whether there is any real prospect of Titoism in China and whether the Russians, on the basis of the lessons learned from the Yugoslavs, are taking any steps to prevent it in the Far East.

From the Soviet press, it seems clear that the Russians are confident that as long as the Chinese Communists fight, whether against Chiang Kai-shek or elsewhere, there is no danger of Titoism, since China will need Soviet help. Hence, the USSR is dong everything it can to encourage the Chinese Communists to continue the fight in Asia.

While the fighting continues, Soviet propaganda organs are operating in full gear to offset any possibility of Titoism by emphasizing all that China and Russia have in common. Reports in the Soviet press of Russians travelling in China and the news about prominent Chinese visiting the USSR make it clear that certain arguments are being dinned into Chinese ears.

In the first place, the Chinese are being told that there exists no religious problem between Russia and China, as is the case in Europe, especially between Russia and the predominantly Roman Catholic states. Second, it is being emphasized time and again that the Russians are not race-conscious, as is the West, and therefore no such friction can disturb Sino-Soviet relations. Third, the Russians are calling Chinese attention to the fact that both the Russian and Chinese peoples are predominantly agricultural, that the Russians have always had much more in common

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with the Orient than with the West, that they have, therefore, greater sympathy and understanding with Chinese aspirations. Finally, the Russians remind the Chinese day in and day out that the Soviet Union has no colonies in the Far East or in the Orient as do the Western powers.

There is another long-term project which is being undertaken to lay the foundations of Sino-Soviet friendship broad and deep and thus avert Titoism. Russian and Chinese scholars are burning the midnight oil to find some means of overcoming the language barrier between the two nations. There are hints in the Soviet press that an alphabet may be worked out based on Russian characters and similar to the one introduced in the Mongolian People's Republic in 1949.

Meanwhile, the Russians and the Chinese Communists are staging a campaign for the intensive study by their peoples of the Chinese and Russian languages respectively. The speech of Alexander Fadeyev, representative of the Union of Soviet Writers at the founding of the Society for Sino-Soviet Friendship in Peking, which was published in *Pravda,* October 8, 1949, lamented the fact that all too few Russians know Chinese and that all too few Chinese classics have been translated into Russian. He vowed that all this would be changed within a few years.

As another means of overcoming the language barrier, thousands of Chinese students are going to the Soviet Union for technical, linguistic and ideological training, especially to the Universities of Moscow, Leningrad, Tomsk, and Irkutsk. Likewise a great number of Russian students are now in China, either on exchange or on scholarships.

In addition to academic work, night schools are being opened in Russia for the study of Chinese and in China for the study of Russian. For example, *Pravda* for April 19, 1950, reports that the Society for Sino-Soviet Friendship alone has opened night schools in Peking, Paoting, Kalgan, Shanghai, Hankow, Canton, Lanchow, and Tsingtao.

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It should be understood that efforts are being made to reach every stratum of society. Large numbers of Chinese workers are being sent to Siberia in shifts, some to learn trades, others to provide manual labor or to produce goods for China. It is safe to say that there are close to a million of these Chinese in Siberia at the present time who are picking up Russian and daily being indoctrinated against Titoism. In view of what has happened heretofore, in the cases of Koreans and Japanese who have gone to the Soviet Union, it is not unlikely that some of these Chinese workers are being trained in Soviet military tactics for future action in the Far East.

Unlike American workers who went to Russia looking for a Soviet Utopia during the last depression, only to be sadly disillusioned, many unskilled Chinese laborers, who have never seen the West, or perhaps even the westernized Chinese ports, are much more likely to find Soviet industrial and agricultural achievements worthy of emulation. It is not for nothing that *Pravda* frequently refers to Soviet Uzbekistan as "the Socialist beacon of the East," and that the Soviet government has spent huge sums there on irrigation projects, mining development and transportation.

In spite of all the efforts of the Soviet Union to bridge the gap between Russia and China and to lay the groundwork for permanent friendship, it is clear from the Soviet press that the Russians are very sensitive on the subject of China. For instance, accusations by the Western powers about Soviet domination of Bulgaria or the European satellites produce scarcely a ripple in the Soviet press; but similar accusations of Soviet aggrandizement at the expense of China are likely to elicit a prompt denial from high Soviet officials in *Pravda* or *Izvestia,* sometimes within twenty-four hours.

While the Russians have staked everything on China, their involvement there is a two-edged sword. If they succeed, the Soviets have a chance to become the strongest power on earth.

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If Mao Tse-tung should become an Oriental Tito, this spells doom for the Soviet dream of world empire.

Under existing circumstances, the answer as to whether there is an immediate prospect of Titoism in China would seem to be "No." If the West is interested in promoting Titoism there, however, it is clear that our propaganda agencies must be sure to have their facts straight when they accuse the Soviets of encroachment, and then see that they reach the Chinese people. There is no doubt that as regards China the Soviet press is today highly sensitive to this sort of criticism.

It is significant, however, that Mao Tse-tung on June 24 (published in *Pravda* June 25, 1950), the very eve of the invasion of South Korea, still lined up China unequivocally on the side of the Soviet Union when he said: "In the international arena, in order to attain our great goal we must closely unite with the Soviet Union, with the various countries of the people's democracy, and with all the peace-loving and democratic forces of the entire world. On this issue, there can be not the slightest indecision or hesitation." It stands to reason that, irrespective of the motives behind it, President Truman's announcement on June 27 that the United States Seventh Fleet would defend Formosa against invasion by the Chinese Communists was hardly conducive to Titoism in China.

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CHAPTER VIII

CIVILIAN DEFENSE IN THE USSR

THE AVERAGE American has heard a good deal from our military experts on the strength of the Soviet armed forces, but there has been little or no reference in our press to the organization of the Soviet population for civilian defense and preparedness.

In 1948, with the coming of the cold war, the Soviet government began to evince unusual concern over civilian defense activities, in regard to which the Soviet public apparently had become altogether too apathetic. The scope of the movement was greatly enlarged and a new periodical *Voyenniye Znaniya* (Military Knowledge) made its appearance, superseding the earlier propaganda organ *Za Oboronu* (For Defense).

Since the beginning of 1949 this magazine has not been allowed to circulate outside the Soviet Union, and existing subscriptions to it were not renewed. It is suspected that the inclusion of several articles therefrom in *Soviet Press Translations,* which gave rise to considerable inquiry and comment in this country, may have had something to do with the decision to terminate subscriptions abroad. It should be said, however, that a number of Soviet papers, including *Krasnaya Zvezda* (Red Star), the official organ of the Soviet Army, although available inside the USSR, are not permitted to circulate abroad.

In 1948, in line with the new defense campaign, large masses of the Soviet population were urged to join one of the new civilian defense agencies, DOSARM, DOSAV, or DOSFLOT—the first being the Volunteer Society for Aid to the Army, and the other two performing the same function for the Air Force and Navy respectively. The city of Leningrad set the pattern for the rest of the country by establishing strong organizations to serve as auxiliaries to the three branches of the armed services, and other cities throughout the country followed suit. No figures appear to have been released as to the extent of the membership in these

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societies, but in 1948 it was reported that tens of thousands of Soviet citizens had joined DOSFLOT in the Ukraine alone, where 1000 auxiliary collectives had already been established.

The important fact is that as early as 1948 the Soviet government took active measures to enlist the able-bodied civilian population, especially the youth and the veterans, in one of the three auxiliary services. For two years now, in each Soviet city the branches of DOSARM, DOSAV, and DOSFLOT have provided basic military, air, and naval training for Soviet citizens, have rendered service to regular units of the armed forces stationed in the vicinity, and have prepared large masses of the Soviet population to cope with any emergency.

The organizations of DOSARM, DOSAV, and DOSFLOT have paid special attention to the development of Soviet sports. "All the sports activity of the DOSARM," according to *Voyenniye Znaniya* for September, 1948, "must have a clearly expressed military-educational and military-training character." Thus it trains its members to be expert marksmen, expert horsemen, to drive cars or motorcycles, to operate radio transmission sets, to become firstrate skiers, etc. Motorcycle contests held by DOSARM in 1948 in central Siberia were conducted not on smooth-surfaced roads but over rough ground, interspersed with water obstacles, under conditions approximating those in war. In the Crimea, DOSARM motorcyclists climbed Mt. Roman-Kosh. In the Urals, a militarized motor cavalcade made a round trip from Sverdlovsk to Tchelyabinsk.

Similarly the DOSFLOT cultivates water sports, trains river and coastal pilots, mechanics, and other specialists, and conducts excursions by river or sea. All three organizations aim to attract war veterans, in order that they may impart to members the knowledge gained in World War II, and that they may bring that knowledge up-to-date by continued study.

In addition to the sports activities and contests conducted by DOSARM, DOSAV, and DOSFLOT, it should be emphasized that

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Soviet sports as a whole have been geared to military purposes. In other words, there is in the Soviet Union today no sport for sport's sake, any more than there is art for art's sake, or science for science's sake. For instance, a news item from Kazan, as reported in *Pravda,* January 29, 1950, reveals that students from the Bauman Veterinary Institute there were undertaking a skiing expedition from Kazan to Ufa, giving lectures and talks en route on the Stalin Constitution, the Soviet election laws, and the achievements of the Tatar Autonomous Republic under the Soviet regime.

Soviet sports are designed primarily to raise a healthy, physically strong, resourceful population, inured to hardships, and better prepared for "labor and defense." Athletic organizations are expected to see to it that every athlete fulfills his quota, just as in industry and agriculture, for which, significantly enough, he receives the GTO badge, which signifies "Ready for Labor and Defense."

Even Soviet trade unions have been called upon to direct the activity of the volunteer societies and physical culture collectives, with the idea of making sports an integral part of the Communist education of workers. Factory workers in the Donbass and Kuzbass have literally been prodded into joining sports or physical culture organizations to undergo some type of training in their spare time. In the past year, the Soviet press has given increased publicity to all sports activities, from football and basketball to track races and tennis matches. This is especially true of the popular illustrated weekly *Ogonyok,* which devotes a regular section to sports events.

The Soviet attitude toward sports was further revealed in an article on "Hunting" in *Pravda* for April 11, 1948, by M. Kuznetsov, Director of the Central Administration for Wild Life of the Council of Ministers of the Russian Federation. He made it clear that hunting is "no frivolous pastime," but a matter of importance to the State, and should be taken up by "millions"

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of Soviet citizens. His article emphasizes what excellent snipers the Siberian hunters proved to be in the last war. In brief, it is clear that the Soviet government considers hunting not merely a sport, but a first-class preparation for guerilla warfare.

Of special interest is the recent report in *Ogonyok,* No. 16, April, 1950, on the program of the 1950 summer sports season. One does not have to be a military expert to note that many of the major sports events and contests are scheduled to take place in highly strategic centers along the Black Sea coast from Sotchi to Batum, on the Caspian at Baku, and in the Baltic area at Vilna, as well as in other leading cities of the Soviet Union.

Nor is this emphasis on sports confined to European Russia. The Central Asiatic Republics are staging their own sports competition, or Spartakiade, in the city of Alma-Ata in southern Kazakhstan, not far from the Sinkiang border. From Uzbekistan, the Socialist beacon of the East, where the 1950 sports season opened in April, comes the report that the number of sports collectives increases year by year, that they include not only men but Uzbek women. One can almost predict with certainty that similar reports will soon be forthcoming from Communist China.

CHAPTER IX

THE SOVIET CRUSADE FOR PEACE

IN THE HISTORY of the Soviet Union, 1949 will be known as the year that opened the great Soviet crusade for peace. In the eyes of the Soviet people and to many outsiders, the USSR came to be regarded as the "champion of peace," in contrast to the Western democracies, which were everywhere represented within the Soviet orbit as the "instigators of a new World War."

Two articles in the Soviet press pretty well sum up the background and gist of this peace propaganda campaign—one an editorial entitled "The Invincible Movement of the Peace Parti-

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sans," in the Soviet biweekly *Bolshevik,* No. 2, January, 1950; and the other, a moving article "For Peace!" by the well-known Soviet journalist and novelist Ilya Ehrenburg, in *Pravda,* February 26, 1950. Both speak *ex cathedra, Bolshevik* being the official organ of the Politburo and *Pravda* that of the Communist Party.

One of the chief purposes of the crusade, which *Bolshevik* terms "a holy conflict," is to convince the Soviet people and their allies that, no matter what may happen in the future, the record will show that the USSR strove with all its might and main for peace, for the abolition of atomic weapons and world disarmament. The Soviet government, it should be noted, came to power in 1917 on a platform of "Peace and Bread!", and its leaders therefore have reason to know how effective such a program can be among the people at large.

It should likewise be noted, however, that while the Soviet Union has since the spring of 1949 talked peace as never before, it has in practice continued its preparations for war on a vast scale. On the contrary, although the official pronouncements of the USA in the same period have been concerned less and less with peace and more and more with the waging of the "cold war" and "total diplomacy," our actual preparations to date have been by no means commensurate with the official and unofficial statements of what we plan to do "to contain" communism.

To establish the crusade for peace outside the USSR, the Soviet Union in 1949 took the initiative in inaugurating on a world-wide basis the movement known as the Partisans of Peace. The movement has shown particular strength in France and Italy, but national congresses have also been held in China, India, Japan, the USA, Canada, Cuba, Mexico, and Brazil, among other countries. The official propaganda organ of this new Soviet agency is *The Partisans of Peace,* established in August, 1949, which, according to *Bolshevik* for May, 1950, is being distributed

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in seventy countries, with German, English, Chinese, Spanish, French, Portuguese, and Russian editions available and plans for Italian and Arabic editions pending. It is designed to prevent, or at least to postpone war, and by hammering away at the allegedly "aggressive" tactics of the Western democracies, to create internal dissension among them and to disrupt American efforts to arm other nations in Europe and Asia.

One of the striking aspects of the program of the Peace Partisans as revealed in *Bolshevik*—and a wholly new departure for the Soviet government—is their appeal not only to trade-union, women's, educational and cultural groups, but also to *religious* organizations in the cause of peace. In line with this policy the new Stalin International Peace Prizes—the Soviet counterpart of the Nobel Prizes—which were established to commemorate Stalin's seventieth anniversary, and are to be awarded annually on December 21, will go to "citizens of any country in the world, irrespective of their political, *religious,* or racial differences. . . ." The importance of this departure can be guaged by the fact that while Article 129 of the Stalin Constitution afforded asylum to foreign citizens persecuted for defending the interests of the working people, for scientific activities, or in their struggle for national liberation, it contained no mention of asylum on the basis of religious persecution.

It is clear, therefore, that the Russians have, during and since the war, discovered how influential are the churches abroad in the cause of peace. They have likewise found out how useful the Russian Orthodox Church has been and can still be to them in foreign policy, especially in the Balkans. Moreover, Soviet leaders have become very greatly interested in the Near and Middle East, where the religious element is deeply rooted. Therefore, they appear to be changing their tactics toward any religious believers or sects—Catholic, Protestant, Moslem, Buddhist, etc.—that will help them to wage peace.

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The propaganda material of the Soviet peace campaign, it must be admitted, is often well done and is reasonably convincing, at least from the European and Oriental standpoint. One reason is, no doubt, that the writers employed, like Ilya Ehrenburg, for instance, have seen the horrors of war at first hand, and are themselves convinced of the sincerity of the crusade for peace.

The Soviet government appears to be desirous of maintaining peace, if at all possible, for at least two years, for the following reasons: It has been and hopes to continue to achieve through peace what would otherwise have to be won by war. Within two years it expects to have healed the wounds of the last war and to be strong enough for any eventuality—either for aggressive or defensive war. Soviet leaders seem to anticipate, too, that by that time Mao Tse-tung will have accomplished his mission in the Orient. Finally, they are trying to sell the idea that by 1952, with the consolidation of the Soviet position in Europe and that of China in Asia, the United States will be cut off from foreign markets, will be reaping the results of its overexpenditures abroad, and will at last be overtaken by the depression which they originally and erroneously predicted for 1949.

It is highly important that the American people should understand what is the essence of the Soviet concept of the "durable and lasting peace" they hammer about so persistently in their press. The Soviet concept of a peace settlement has been and is basically one by which the USA and the USSR would divide the world between them. Since Americans were not prepared for such a "deal," which they would term "appeasement" or "capitulation," Soviet leaders now intend, if they can, "to enforce" such a peace upon us.

With their own sixteen republics, the nations of the Cominform in Europe, and the Mongol, Korean and Chinese Republics in Asia, *Bolshevik* estimates that they now have in their camp some 800,000,000 people, which is more than the Western democracies can hope to enlist. It is worth noting that since the inauguration

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of the Peace Partisan Movement the Soviet press has been paying more attention to the manpower on its side than to strategic bases and territory. According to Ilya Ehrenburg, we have plenty of generals in the Atlantic Bloc, but few soldiers and even fewer that can be counted upon.

Some Americans, impatient over the deadlock in the UNO, have advocated the expulsion of the Soviet Union from that organization, or have openly expressed the hope that it would withdraw, in order that the "democracies" may make their own peace settlement without the USSR. In the event of such withdrawal or expulsion, the Soviet press has already implied that the Soviet Union is in a position, with the support of the states mentioned above and a few others too close to the Soviet orbit to abstain, to set up its own Communist United Nations, which would in numbers be more widely representative than ours of the people of the world.

It seems to have been just this contingency that Trygve Lie, Secretary-General of the UNO, feared, and which gave rise to his mission to Moscow in June, 1950, to find some formula to end the existing deadlock. It is clear that for all practical purposes Soviet withdrawal or expulsion from the UNO would divide the World between the colossus of the East and that of the West, rather much in line with the Soviet concept. In other words, it would "enforce" their concept of the peace.

The Russians have pursued their peace crusade in 1950 with even more zeal than in 1949, reporting more than 300,000,000 signatures inside and outside the Soviet orbit to the Stockholm peace appeal of the Permanent Committee of the World Congress of Peace Partisans, which called for the banning of atomic weapons. At the same time, however, the Soviet press by constant repetition is convincing the Soviet people that the Western democracies, led by the USA, are deliberately arming nation after nation along the borders of the Soviet sphere, with a view to

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encirclement of the USSR and ultimate war upon her. Our total diplomacy, which was designed to strike fear into their hearts, has made them angry instead. Unless we intend to convince them of our peaceful intentions by picking up the broken threads of diplomacy and bringing the cold war to a speedy conclusion, we would do well to face realities and prepare for war on a much vaster scale than now appears to be envisaged. Indeed, if we continue to pursue "total diplomacy" without making this country totally impregnable from a military standpoint we are derelict in our duty and invite catastrophe.

Facing ultimate encirclement the Soviets will, in the opinion of this writer, as soon as they consider themselves ready, either precipitate a direct attack upon the USA or an indirect attack on one of the armed American satellites, which will just as surely involve us.* Such a situation may well arise if the Soviet-Chinese Axis outflanks us in Southeast Asia and becomes dizzy with success. The fact that Molotov is the power behind the throne in the coordination of the Soviet-Chinese Axis is not reassuring.

In this writer's opinion, Stalin has been thus far the chief deterrent to war. If he should die before any *modus vivendi* between the East and the West has been reached, the whole situation will be open to revaluation. The other Soviet leaders appear to this observer to be less willing than the Georgian to bargain and "to coexist peacefully," and, including Molotov, a Great Russian, more likely to risk action than to continue the Stalin policy of ultimate victory by peaceful means.

*Some two weeks after this was written the invasion of Southern Korea took place.

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CHAPTER X

KOREA: THE SOVIET WAR-GUILT THESIS

ALTHOUGH THERE has been no war-guilt debate on the origins of World War II comparable to that which raged in the Twenties over World War I, the major opponents in the Korean conflict lost no time in seeking to establish the responsibility for aggression. It stands to reason that the Soviet government, through its press, sought to pin the war-guilt label on the United States, and that its case against America is being propagated not only in the countries inside the Soviet orbit, but all over Asia. In order to refute this propaganda effectively, we must be sure that we are well posted in regard to the war-guilt thesis the Soviets are seeking to build up against us.

The invasion of South Korea by the North Koreans on June 25, 1950, came as a surprise to Americans. In the Soviet press, however, there was never any secret as to the ultimate intentions of the North Korean satellite state toward American-sponsored South Korea. At least as early as November 2, 1946, *Pravda,* in an article by P. Ivanov on "Elections in North Korea," outlined the election platform of the United National Democratic Front, which included the following planks: "the creation of an independent Korean state and a democratic Korean government; the carrying out of land reforms all over Korea; the nationalization throughout Korea of industry, transport, banks, and financial institutions that belonged to the Japanese and to the betrayers of the Korean people; democratic re-education, similar to that which has already been established in North Korea." The Soviet press has consistently and quite openly assumed that it was only a matter of time until the two sections of Korea would be reunited.

In the August, 1948, elections to the Supreme People's Assembly which ratified the Constitution of the Korean People's Democratic

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Republic (North Korea), 360 deputies (indirectly elected in the South Korean underground) represented the population of South Korea and 212 deputies the population of North Korea. It was this People's government which ever since has claimed to act for all Korea and which at once called for the simultaneous withdrawal of Soviet and American troops from Korea.

If any doubts remained in the USSR as to the ultimate absorption of South Korea by the North, they were removed by a TASS dispatch from Pyongyang which appeared in *Izvestia,* June 10, 1950, under the headline "For a United, Democratic Korea." Although this dispatch, which appeared some two weeks prior to the actual invasion, ostensibly reported a North Korean appeal for peaceful and voluntary reunion, it incidentally revealed the time-table for the "liberation" of all Korea. This liberation, *Izvestia* implied, was to be completed by August 5-8, 1950, at which time nation-wide elections were to be held to set up a supreme legislative organ for a united Korea. August 15, the fifth anniversary of the liberation of Korea from the Japanese yoke, was the date set for the official proclamation of a united Korea in the capital city of Seoul. Approximately the same information was repeated in *Pravda* for June 21, 1950.

Ever since the appeal of President Kim Il-sung of June 26 to the Korean people (published *Pravda,* June 27, 1950), which announced that the People's Army of North Korea had been ordered to repulse an attack launched by the troops of Syngman Rhee, the tone of the Soviet press has changed. In a series of statements and articles it has sought to pin the war guilt on the government of South Korea and its American advisers. Soviet correspondents have quoted the New York *Times,* the *Herald Tribune,* and the *Christian Science Monitor* to substantiate the aggressive designs of South Korea and the fighting trim of its military forces.

In an official statement in *Pravda,* July 4, 1950, Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, seeking to prove that the South Korean

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attack had been planned far in advance of the outbreak of hostilities, called attention to the remarks of Syngman Rhee to a United Press correspondent as early as October 7, 1949, to the effect that his forces could capture Pyongyang, the capital of North Korea, in a matter of three days. Gromyko likewise pointed out that Syngman Rhee on June 19, 1950, addressing the National Assembly of South Korea in the presence of State Department Adviser John Foster Dulles, declared: "If we are unable to defend democracy in a cold war, we will achieve victory in a hot war." In another attempt to establish the war guilt of South Korea and the USA, *Izvestia* for July 9, 1950, under the headline "Vain Attempts to Cover Up the Tracks," quoted General Roberts, former head of the American Military Mission in South Korea, in an interview published in the *Herald Tribune,* June 5, 1950. According to *Izvestia,* Roberts boasted that the group of American military advisers in South Korea afford "living proof that with the intelligent and intensive use of 500 American soldiers and officers steeled in battle, it is possible to train 100,000 men who will fight for us."

The Soviet press has capitalized widely on a photograph of John Foster Dulles in the company of American military advisers and American Ambassador Muccio at the 38th Parallel, examining maps of the North Korean terrain. Dulles' visit to Korea in June, coinciding with the visit of Defense Minister Johnson and Chief of Staff Bradley to Japan, was interpreted by the Soviets as the green light for the alleged South Korean attack.

Having placed upon the United States the responsibility for starting the Korean War, the Soviet government has likewise sought to establish the illegality of American intervention under the banner of the UNO. In support of this position Gromyko, in his official statement of July 4, set forth the following arguments: that United States action antedated the decision of the Security Council, presenting it with a *fait accompli;* that UN approval of American intervention violated Article 27 of the UN

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Charter which requires the affirmative vote of seven members, including "the concurring votes of the permanent members, . . ." the vote having occurred during the absence of the USSR delegate and while the "legal" government of China was excluded from the Security Council; that the Korean conflict was a domestic affair in which Koreans were seeking to restore national unity, and therefore outside the jurisdiction of the UNO; that no effort was made by the Security Council and the Secretary-General to reconcile the belligerents prior to the UN resort to force; and that Trygve Lie, instead of insisting on the observance of the Charter, obediently supported its violation. Abandoning legal technicalities, Gromyko alleged that US pressure had "transformed the UNO into a branch of the State Department and an obedient tool of the USA."

Gromyko then proceeded, with arguments that are likely to prove far more telling in the Far East than legal technicalities as to the violation of the UN Charter, to impugn American motives in the armed intervention in Korea and to lay at America's door the responsibility for the devastation that has accompanied it. Rejecting as naive President Truman's claim that the United States is merely engaged in "police action against a group of North Korean bandits," Gromyko sardonically alleged that police action does not require flying fortresses, jet bombers, air bombardment of civilians and peaceful cities under the military direction of a man like General MacArthur. He classed American action in Korea with Japanese intervention in North China in 1937 for the alleged purpose of restoring "law and order," and claimed that our real motives were to get possession of all Korea, to make of it a colony and a military strategic base in the Far East. Since the Soviet Union chooses to view the Korean situation as a civil war to restore national unity, Gromyko undertook to compare American intervention there to England's support of the South in its attempt to break the Union in the American Civil War and to

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Allied intervention in Russia following the Bolshevik Revolution.

Having depicted America as the chief obstacle to Korean national unification, the Soviet government seeks to brand the United States as an imperialist aggressor throughout the Orient. In support of this thesis, Gromyko cited the American decision to protect Formosa as an outright act of aggression against Communist China, our promised aid to the Philippines as an effort to reduce that country to the status of a colonial appendage, and our aid to Indo-China as the unleashing of war against the Vietnamese. In brief, the Soviet press seeks to prove to Asia that the United States, after preparing for aggression, has now gone over to outright aggression in a number of Asiatic countries, that it is in fact pursuing the role of a "gendarme" in the Orient. Gromyko demanded the "unconditional" cessation of American intervention and the withdrawal of American troops from Korea.

Approximately the same arguments were summed up in *Pravda,* August 7, 1950, in an editorial entitled: "Ignorance on Questions of International Law." The Soviet war-guilt thesis was further reinforced by a series of articles published in *Izvestia,* August 9, 1950, by Academicians Eugene Tarle and E. A. Korovin, and by F. I. Kozhevnikov, Professor of International Law at the University of Moscow. In his speeches before the UN Security Council in August, 1950, Yakov Malik, the Soviet representative, does not appear to have added anything new on this issue that had not already appeared in the Soviet press.

At a time when the United States received the virtually unanimous plaudits of the Western World as a result of its prompt assumption of leadership to stem the tide of aggression in the Far East, the Soviet allegations struck a jarring and discordant note. Were it not for the widespread and repeated dissemination of this propaganda, we might ignore it as fantastic. Strange as it may seem to us, however, this highly distorted picture of America as aggressor Number One in Korea and the Far East is and no doubt will continue to be regarded as gospel truth by millions of

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Russian and satellite peoples behind the Iron Curtain. In the absence of information to the contrary, even the more intelligent citizens of those countries, who are inclined to discount the official propaganda line, are nevertheless likely to believe that South Korea, instigated and abetted by the United States, provoked the Korean conflict. It is safe to say that this case against America is already being entered in the 1950 editions of Soviet, Chinese, and satellite textbooks.

It is therefore to be hoped that our propaganda and intelligence agencies, armed with knowledge of the Soviet war-guilt thesis, will make herculean efforts to refute it effectively, point by point, in programs and literature designed to reach the peoples inside the Soviet orbit and everywhere in the vitally important continent of Asia.

CHAPTER XI

FACING THE RISE OF THE SLAVIC AND ASIATIC WORLD

THE FOREGOING chapters have merely scratched the surface in an attempt to give the American reader some idea of how much the Soviet press reveals—the Iron Curtain notwithstanding—about recent trends in Soviet domestic and foreign policy. These chapters have deliberately stressed the current Soviet preoccupation with Asia, both at home in Asiatic Russia and beyond the Soviet borders in the Far East.

Although this writer, both as a student and teacher of Russian history and literature, has been following the Soviet press consistently for the past thirty years, he has never seen the Soviet government devote so much effort, money, and attention to the study of Asia, including both the Far and the Near East, as now during postwar years. Not only have Soviet scholars ranged from the archeological past to the contemporary history and culture

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of the other Asiatic countries, but they have seen to it that the most representative works of Russian culture, both of Tsarist and Soviet times, have been made available in Chinese, Korean, Mongolian, Japanese, and recently in Arabic.

Believing as he does, that the future of America is tied up with the Orient even more than with Europe, this writer is deeply disturbed over the fact that our efforts to win the peoples of Asia have not been anywhere nearly commensurate with our interests. Indeed, our chief emphasis in these same postwar years has been and still is placed on supplying all too limited quantities of arms and ammunition to stem the tide of communism in Asia. We have not spent comparable sums to give the peoples of Asia a real key to American civilization and culture. We have, of course, reached a small fraction, mainly the educated and business groups, but the Soviets are reaching out not only for them but for the masses of the people. For the present, they appear to be having considerable success. One reason is that their approach is basically cultural.

Our method of approach to the Far and Near East, and to the Slavic world, educationally speaking, has been too often a Western approach. These peoples are steeped in culture, even in areas where literacy is low. To provide them with a formal history of the United States, political or economic, and a smattering of American technique is not enough to win them in spirit, to give them a real key to the American genius. Although we have any number of scholars qualified to present American civilization and culture to the peoples of Asia, we have not yet done it successfully, judging by the results to date. Today, in large areas of Asia, the Communists are already presenting American history and the American way of life to these peoples in a different and highly distorted light.

In this country, too, it seems, we have too often *trained* rather than educated our own students *vis à vis* the Slavic and Oriental world, been satisfied with formal courses on the political and

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international background of a part of the world where civilization and culture provide the best key to understanding.

Speaking from personal experience, this writer knows that most of our educators, with their Western approach, would never think of looking in a Russian novel for a key to Soviet policy or development. Yet it was precisely in the novel *Port Arthur* by A. Stepanov, published in 1944, that Soviet intentions of recovering that Pacific port were first revealed. In the same way, Wanda Wasilevskaya's prize-winning novel *The Rainbow* foreshadowed the main lines of Soviet policy toward Germany at the end of the war. A recent Soviet novel about a Central Asiatic "millionaire" collective farm (*The Millionaire* by Gabiden Mustafin) provides a clue as to what is being accomplished with a Moslem population in one generation. In this *kolkhoz,* even the oldsters are raising pigs, eating pork, and drinking vodka! Since Soviet literature still provides the best key to the Soviet Union, it is to be hoped that our scholars, in their approach to the new Far East, will not overlook recent Chinese fiction and that English translations will be provided as quickly as possible. Russian translations are already available. A recent article indicative of the quantity of Russian literature already in Chinese translation is to be found in *Oktyabr* (October) for May, 1950, under the title "Books in the New China," by N. Walter.

The emergency area courses that sprang up almost overnight in this country during the Second World War in themselves constituted a protest against our formal courses, which, while providing a record of events, so often failed to provide for an understanding of the peoples who had become our enemies or our allies. Yet our efforts in these postwar years, when we already envisage another world conflict, are still fragmentary and totally inadequate. Today we have to prepare for total war or total peace, and in either event we need to reach not just the fringe but the masses of our own people as well as the peoples of other countries.

In June 1950 thousands of students graduated from our colleges

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and universities, not to mention other hundreds of thousands from our high schools, who have gone forth to face this new world. Yet the bulk of them still leave our educational institutions without having had even an introductory course either on the Soviet Union or on the Far East, much less a real grounding in the language, civilization, and culture of these parts of the world.

For ideological reasons, some educators and some parents may prefer to close their eyes to the study of the 800,000,000 people the Soviets claim to have won over to the Soviet Bloc, and even to discourage it. If so, they are doing an outright disservice to the United States of America. If we failed to profit from what happened in China, we should certainly learn our lesson from what has taken place in Korea.

We are facing the rise of the Slavic and Asiatic world—and we face it now, whether we like it or not. Its impact is already felt here and throughout the world. We may with impunity ignore the study of weak powers or remote colonial appendages, but we cannot afford to remain ignorant of them when they are strong. Nor is the building up of armaments alone—although under existing circumstances they are an absolute necessity—enough to defend our heritage. If the outcome is to be a third world war, knowledge may win it; knowledge acquired in time may also prevent it.

The University of Washington has been a pioneer in this country in making available introductory courses in Russian language and civilization, in Far Eastern languages and problems of the Pacific, on the undergraduate level, at a time when most universities stressed the training of a few specialists in the graduate schools. Most American students do not go beyond the high school, or at least beyond the college level. If we are to reach them at all, we must reach them at these levels; and if our training is to prove effective, we must reach them *en masse,* not just a mere fraction of them as is true today.

Let us then, while we still can do it, adjust our college and high

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school curricula, not only locally but on a nationwide basis, so that the masses of our young people, for their own defense, will not continue to be abysmally ignorant of the Slavic and Oriental worlds. This writer knows students who unexpectedly found themselves consigned to China, Southeast Asia, and the Soviet Union during World War II; students who thanked their lucky stars when their schools or their parents had been sufficiently far-sighted to provide them with even a modicum of linguistic and cultural knowledge to prepare them for such experiences.

A broader comparative study of the Soviet Union, of the Near and the Far East, will not only provide our young people with the information they vitally need to face the world today and tomorrow, but it will make them appreciate and understand America more. Above all, the time has come when educators and parents who have the vital interests of the United States at heart should see that their students or children, as the case may be, are armed with knowledge as well as with guns. The course of the war in Korea so far has shown only too well that there is no time to lose.

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DON'T LAUGH IT OFF!

The average American, upon seeing Soviet cartoons, might be inclined to laugh them off and to underestimate their significance as a first-rate propaganda weapon in the East-West struggle for the mind and soul of man. However, this is not the case in the Soviet Union and throughout large areas of the Orient where, to the illiterate and semiliterate masses, oral and visual propaganda still take precedence over the written word.

Since 1945 the Soviet press, and especially the magazine *Krokodil* (Crocodile), in dealing with the world crisis, have made increasingly effective use of propaganda by cartoons, with the United States as the number one target. There is no doubt that these cartoons impress, not only the peoples of the USSR, but others far beyond the Soviet borders. Even Americans who see them, although repelled by the gross distortion of American aims and objectives, will admit that they are clever—diabolically so.

The sample of Soviet cartoons included herewith is intended merely to demonstrate the magnitude of the task confronting our American propaganda agencies. To be sure, we have first-rate American cartoonists, but their product has been designed mainly for home consumption. As yet, it seems, they have not made any serious and concerted effort to produce the kind of cartoon that will make a profound impression in the Soviet Union and throughout Asia.

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Компанья уоллстритовских господ
Сожгла бы мир, когда бы было можно.
И видит око, только зуб неймёт,
Поскольку нынче мир
в руках надёжных.

PEACE IN RELIABLE HANDS

The Wall Street Gang
Would set the world on fire
If it had its way.
But it can't!

***Krokodil*, 20 June 1949.**

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Рис. Вор. ЕФИМОВА.

УСЕРДНОЕ БОЛЬШИНСТВО

(СЦЕНКА НА АССАМБЛЕЕ)

— Господа, что вы? Опустите руки! Мистер Остин всего-навсего приглаживает волосы!

ZEALOUS MAJORITY

(UN Assembly)

—Gentlemen, what are you doing? Put your hands down! Mr. Austin is simply smoothing his hair!

Krokodil, 20 November 1948.

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

OLD AND NEW CHINA

Old China:—Manufacturer: Scram! I don't need you!
New China:—Chinese Soldier: Scram! We don't need you!

***Krokodil*, 30 March 1950.**

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ФУНТ ДОЛЛАРУ — Простите, я вас не стесняю?

Says the Pound to the Dollar: Excuse me, am I crowding you?

***Krokodil*, 10 October 1949.**

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H. H. FISHER, *Chairman,*
The Hoover Institute and Library on War,

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"A mo e
source of

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Born in Kiev, Russia, Dr. Ivar Spector served in the Imperial Russian Army during World War I. He escaped from Russia in 1920 and has lived in the United States since 1921, becoming an American citizen in 1927.

Having completed his undergraduate studies in Russia, he received his degree of M.A. from Northwestern University and his Ph.D. from the Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago. Dr. Spector has been an educator at the University of Washington since 1931, where he has taught Russian language, literature and history. He is the author of four books and many articles on Russia. His latest book, *An Introduction to Russian History and Culture,* is being used extensively in universities and colleges in this country and abroad.

From October, 1946, to June, 1950, Dr. Spector served as editor of *Soviet Press Translations,* a bi-weekly publication of the Far Eastern and Russian Institute of the University of Washington. Currently, this publication goes to members in various branches of the Army, Navy, Intelligence Service, and State Department as well as to public and private organizations. Here are some of their comments:

"I thought you might be interested to know that I find very useful your present method of making selections for translation from the Soviet Press."

JOHN FOSTER DULLES.

"One of the most significant contributions made by a private organization to our understanding of Soviet policy and propaganda."

WILLIAM T. STONE,
Director of the Office of Information and Educational Exchange,
U. S. State Department.

(Continued on Inside Cover)

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